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Abstract 
 
It is a widely adopted practice for firms to announce new products well in advance of 
actual market availability.  The incentives for pre-announcements are stronger in markets 
with network effects because they can be used to induce the delay of consumers’ 
purchases and forestall the build-up of rival products’ installed bases.  However, such 
announcements often are not fulfilled, raising antitrust concerns.  We analyze the effects 
of product pre-announcements in the presence of network effects when firms are allowed 
to strategically make false announcements.  We also discuss their implications for 
consumer welfare and anti-trust policy. 
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I. Introduction 
We analyze the effects of strategic product pre-announcements in markets with 
network effects.  It is a widely adopted practice for firms to announce new products well 
in advance of actual market availability.  The incentives for pre-announcements to delay 
the purchase decision of consumers are stronger in markets with network effects because 
they can be used to induce the delay of consumers’ purchases and forestall the build-up 
of rival products’ installed bases.  However, such announcements often are not fulfilled.  
Consequently, the practice of pre-announcement has been derisively referred to as 
“vaporware” since many of the products either never reach the market or are significantly 
delayed.1  As such, the practice has been subject to scrutiny by policymakers for its 
potential predatory and anti-competitive implications.  One prominent example in 
antitrust is the IBM case in the 1960s in which  IBM announced the development of its 
System/360 line of computers and related peripherals far in advance of their availability.  
The Department of Justice subsequently accused IBM of making premature and 
predatory product announcements regarding the product line.2  
In relation to the landmark antitrust case of U.S. vs. IBM, Fisher, et al. (1983) 
provide an early discussion of information transmission, product pre-announcement, and 
reputation. In defense of such a practice, Fisher, et al. argue: 
 
In general, there is no reason to inhibit the time when a firm announces or brings 
products to the marketplace.  Customers will be the final arbiters of the product’s 
quality and the firm’s reputation.  Broken promises and unattractive products can 
be expected to lead quickly to a loss of credibility and sales. . . . Advance 
announcement of truthful information about products cannot be anticompetitive.  
Indeed, such announcement is procompetitive; competition thrives when 
information is good. . . . If those announcements of its belief were made in good 
faith, then it was imparting information to consumers and competitors as to what 
it expected to do.  Even if it was later unable to do those things, the imparting of 
such information can only aid competition.   Only deliberate falsehood could 
                                                 
1 See Bayus et al. (2001) for an entertaining discussion on the origin of the term “vaporware.” 
2 For a detailed discussion of the IBM case, see Fisher et al. (1983).  See also Levy (1997) for antitrust 
implications of vaporware. 
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possibly be anticompetitive here, and that is highly improbable since a firm that 
practiced such tactics would acquire a tarnished reputation that would ill-serve it 
in the future (pp. 289-290).  
 
We provide a simple model of product pre-announcements in markets with 
network effects and discuss its implications for social welfare and anti-trust policy.  In 
particular, we develop a reputation model of vaporware in which firms can make product 
pre-announcements.  More specifically, we consider a situation where a firm develops a 
new product while a competitive product already exists.  Consumers need to decide 
whether to purchase the currently available product or to wait until the advent of the new 
product. For this decision to be relevant, we assume that, due to switching costs, 
consumers cannot purchase the existing product and later make another purchase when 
the new product is available (see Klemperer (1995)).   However, consumers do not have 
perfect information about the quality/availability of the new product, which is the firm’s 
private information.  We ask whether or not consumers can rely on firm-provided 
information concerning the quality/availability of the new product.  Since the firm always 
prefers to have the consumers wait for its product, the firm’s pre-announcement cannot 
have any informational content if the game is played only once.   Thus, we consider a 
pre-announcement game played twice to investigate under what circumstances the firm 
can convey the information in a credible way.   
In our approach, different types of firms with different R&D capabilities have 
different chances of introducing a high-quality product in the second product cycle. We 
derive the value of being honest endogenously and show that the value of being honest 
increases in the chance of introducing a high-quality product in the second product cycle. 
That is, firms with higher R&D capabilities care more about their reputation. We find that 
there can be an informative equilibrium where the product pre-announcement can convey 
information about the product’s quality.  The equilibrium is characterized by a cut-off 
point where semi-separation of types takes place; only types higher than the cut-off point 
have the incentive to tell the truth when product quality is low.  Thus, in equilibrium we 
can observe various outcomes—both lying and telling the truth—depending on the firm’s 
type.   
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This paper builds on our previous work.  In Choi, Kristiansen, and Nahm (2004, 
2005), we analyze the welfare effects of product pre-announcement and discuss its anti-
trust implications.  We model explicitly the formation of reputation in a repeated product 
pre-announcement game and characterize the equilibrium in which private information 
held by the firm is partially revealed.   Our analysis shows that in the model without 
network effects, product pre-announcements always benefit consumers. Even if the firm 
might make misleading claims about its product quality, consumers can rationally 
discount the firm’s claims, and the firm’s announcement can be at least partially 
revealing, which helps consumers make a better decision.  In this paper, we extend the 
analysis to markets with network effects to check the robustness of the previous analysis.   
Formal economic analysis of product pre-announcements that explicitly accounts for 
network effects and the possibility of false announcements is scarce.   The current paper 
intends to fill this gap in the literature.    
Our paper relates two strands of the literature, one on technology adoption with 
network effects and the other on reputation.   Farrell and Saloner (1986) provide an early 
analysis of how product pre-announcements affect consumers’ technology adoption 
decisions.  In response to the argument made above by Fisher, et al. (1983), they point 
out the possibility of anti-competitive product pre-announcements in the presence of 
network effects.  In particular, they construct a dynamic model of technology adoption in 
which the timing of the announcement of a new incompatible product can critically 
determine whether the new product succeeds in replacing the existing technology.  Due to 
the presence of network effects, even if the potential users who decide to wait are indeed 
well-informed and their welfare is increased as a result of product pre-announcement, 
their adoption of the new technology may adversely affect both the users in the installed 
base and later adopters who might have preferred the old technology to the new one.  
Their paper, however, considers only truthful pre-announcements.  The possibility of 
false announcements and consumers’ potentially incorrect inference about the 
informational content of announcements is not analyzed. 
Several papers also analyze how product pre-announcements can be used as a 
strategic tool.   For instance, Bayus, et al. (2001) present a model in which product pre-
announcement is used as a strategic signal for rival firms. In the paper, intentional 
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vaporware is used as a way to dissuade competitors from developing their own 
competing products.  Our proposal, in contrast, intends to analyze a communication 
channel between the firm and consumers.  Thus, the purpose of product pre-
announcement in Bayus, et al. (2001) is entry deterrence, whereas the purpose of our 
model is to persuade consumers to wait until the arrival of its new product. 3 Also, Bayus, 
et al. adopt an ad hoc assumption that making a false announcement is costly, without 
any micro-foundation for penalty costs associated with false announcements.  In contrast, 
we develop a model of vaporware in which the reputation cost is endogenously derived.  
Gerlach (2004) is another paper that examines an entrant’s incentives to pre-announce 
new products when such pre-announcements may induce the incumbent to cut prices and 
preempt the market. He shows that the possibility of a preemptive move by the 
incumbent may prevent the entrant from making announcements.  In contrast to our 
proposal, he focuses primarily on verifiable announcements.4  We show how reputational 
concerns may prevent firms from making false announcements.      
Levy (1997) explores anti-trust implications of vaporware.   As in our model, he 
considers a situation in which consumers do not know the veracity of the firm’s 
announcement when it is made.  However, he does not explicitly model reputation.  
Dranove and Gandal (2003) provide an empirical analysis of pre-announcement effects in 
the DVD market. In the standard war between the DVD and DIVX formats, they show 
that the pre-announcement of DIVX slowed down the adoption of DVD technology, 
which is consistent with our theory. 
Our research proposal is also related to the theoretical literature on strategic 
information transmission, which examines how an uninformed party elicits information 
from an informed party when these two sides can engage in ‘cheap talk.’ (See Crawford 
and Sobel (1982) and Sobel (1985), for example.)   Sobel (1985) analyzes how reputation 
is formed in a cheap talk under the assumption that an ‘honest’ type always tells the truth. 
One important paper that is closely related to ours is Morris (2001).  As in Sobel (1985) 
and our approach, Morris (2001) analyzes reputational concerns that arise endogenously 
                                                 
3 Haan (2003) is another paper that develops a model of vaporware as a means of entry deterrence.   In his 
model, however, separating equilibria do not exist and all firms claim that they have innovation.  As a 
result, pre-announcement has no informational content.  In contrast, in our paper, only a subset of firms lie, 
and, as a result, the pre-announcement is partially informative. 
4 If false announcements were allowed, all firms would lie in equilibrium. 
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when a static cheap-talk game is repeated.  He considers an advice game in which an 
informed advisor wishes to convey a valuable piece of information to an uninformed 
policymaker with identical preferences.  In a twice-repeated cheap-talk game, Morris 
analyzes how reputation concerns affect cheap talk between informed and uninformed 
sides.   In particular, he focuses on the possibility that reputational concerns might lead to 
a situation in which no information is conveyed in equilibrium.  He calls this “political 
correctness.” 5   Both our model and Morris’ deal with how concerns about future 
reputation can impact the transmission of information today.   One major difference is 
that he considers a situation in which the advisor has incentives to tell the truth in a static 
context, but the advisor’s incentives to tell the truth are distorted in a dynamic context.  In 
contrast, we consider a situation in which the informed party always has incentives to lie 
and no information can be conveyed in a static context.  Therefore, we investigate how 
reputational concerns can mitigate this problem.  
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way.  In section II, we 
set up the basic model of product pre-announcements with network effects.  Section III 
derives conditions for an equilibrium in which more innovative firms have incentives to 
maintain their reputations and make truthful announcements, while less innovative firms 
have incentives to make false announcements.   Overall, the announcements are partially 
revealing in equilibrium.  In section IV, we analyze welfare implications of product pre-
announcements.  Section V contains concluding remarks. 
II.  The Model 
In this section, we construct a simple model of product pre-announcements in the 
presence of network effects.   More specifically, we consider a durable goods market in 
which consumers make a choice concerning the timing of their purchase.6  The main 
purpose of pre-announcements in our model is to induce consumers to forego their 
opportunity to purchase currently available products and wait until the new product is 
available.  When the product choice is largely irreversible, there will be more incentives 
                                                 
5 This paradoxical result takes place when the policymaker thinks that the advisor might be biased in favor 
of one decision, and the advisor, wanting his/her valuable advice to have an impact on future decisions, 
does not wish to be thought of as biased. 
6 See Choi (1994) for an analysis of irreversible technology choice with network effects in the absence of 
any product announcements. 
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for such pre-announcements in the presence of network effects.  If the firm succeeds in 
delaying consumers’ purchases, it will not only have a larger consumer base but also face 
a smaller installed base of old products.   
We aim to answer the question of whether pre-announcements of a new product 
can help consumers make better purchasing decisions even when a firm’s announcement 
is non-binding and non-verifiable. Indeed, if the game is played only once, there would 
be no room for the product pre-announcements to be informative. However, if there are 
repeated interactions between the firm and consumers, the firm tries to build its 
reputation.  In Choi et al. (2004), we considered a scenario in which the firm and 
consumers interact repeatedly and developed a reputation model of vaporware.  We 
derived conditions under which product pre-announcements can be informative and 
analyze the welfare effect of product pre-announcement.   In this paper, we extend the 
analysis to markets with network effects.   
Consider a game that is played by consumers and a firm that develops a sequence 
of new products.   For simplicity, we assume that there are two sequential product cycles 
and that a firm can introduce a new product in each cycle.  Let δ denote the time discount 
factor between the first- and second- product cycles.   
In each product cycle, there are two time periods, t=1, 2.  There are also two 
potential consumers, 1 and 2, who arrive sequentially at time t=1 and 2, respectively.  We 
can easily reinterpret each consumer as a group of consumers.  As long as they share the 
same preferences and we make a coordination assumption that they collectively choose 
the Pareto optimal outcome, the analysis will be the same.   Consumers have unit demand 
for the product in each product cycle.  In the first period (t=1), an existing product is 
competitively supplied.  The firm that develops a new product introduces the new product 
in the second period (t=2).  For simplicity, there is no time discount between periods 
within the same product cycle. 7  In period 1, consumer 1 has two options.  She can 
choose the existing product that is competitively supplied, or she can wait until period 2 
when she can make an optimal choice given the quality and price of the new product that 
will be available by that time.  For the first period purchase decision to have dynamic 
                                                 
7 This assumption is made without any loss of generality and discounting within the product cycle can 
easily be accommodated. 
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implications, we assume that, once the consumer purchases in the first period, she is 
locked in and cannot switch to the new product in the second period due to switching 
costs (see Klemperer, 1995).  In addition, I assume that the product in consideration 
exhibits network effects. The exiting product and the new product are incompatible.   I 
denote by ∆ the value each consumer attaches to the network effects conferred when the 
other consumer buys the same product.  
The quality of the new product can be either high (H) or low (L).  The ex ante 
probability that the firm can develop a high-quality product is denoted by θ, which can be 
considered the firm’s type. There are two types of the firm, θ1 and θ2, θ1 < θ2.  The firm 
knows its own type, but consumers know only the distribution of the firm types.  The 
prior belief that the firm is of type θ2 is q. The firm’s type is assumed to be invariant 
across product cycles and represents the firm’s innovativeness or research capability.  
The realization of product quality given the firm’s type, however, is independent across 
product cycles.  The firm that is in the process of developing a new product knows the 
quality of the product in the first period of each product cycle.  The firm can announce 
the quality of the product to consumers in period one to persuade consumers to delay 
their purchase. We assume that product pre-announcements are cheap talk and, thus, do 
not entail any direct costs to make.  
For simplicity, we assume that the production costs for both old and new products 
are zero. Therefore, the existing product is competitively supplied at a price of zero.  The 
stand-alone value of the currently available product in period one is given by w per 
period.  When consumer 1 delays her purchase and waits until period 2, she foregoes the 
current consumption benefit that can be considered her waiting costs.8 The new product 
developed by the firm is superior to the existing product, regardless of its quality 
realizations.   If the quality realization is low, the amount of additional stand-alone value 
the new product provides vis-à-vis the existing product is given by Lν (> 0), that is, its 
                                                 
8 As mentioned earlier, we can easily extend the analysis to a group of consumers in each cohort as long as 
consumers are homogeneous in their waiting costs (w) and, therefore, make the same decision as to 
purchase/wait in the first period.  In Choi et al.  (2004), we assume a group of consumers and allow 
different consumption patterns according to their waiting costs in a model without network effects.  
Analyzing the case of heterogeneous waiting costs with different consumption patterns is much more 
complex in the presence of network effects since we need to keep track of the number of installed base that 
affects future competition.   
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stand-alone value is w + Lν .  If the quality realization is high, we assume that the amount 
of additional stand-alone value consumers derive from the new product is random and 
denoted by Hν .  It can take  Hν with probability α and Hν  with probability (1 − α), 
where Hν > Hν  (>∆).  The actual value is private information revealed to consumers 
only in the second period and is unknown to them in the first period.  This assumption 
reflects the fact that when new features are promised for new software, it would be 
difficult to know in advance how much additional value such features would provide.9  
The assumption also implies that the firm sets its price for the new product knowing only 
the distribution of the values, not the actual value for the consumers. As will be shown 
shortly, this assumption gives consumers an incentive to wait for the new product by 
preventing the firm from extracting all consumer surplus. 
Suppose that consumer 1 has purchased the existing product in the first period and 
the quality realization of the new product is low.  Then consumer 2 has two options.  If he 
makes the same choice as consumer 1 by purchasing the competitively supplied product, 
he receives the surplus of w + ∆.  In contrast, if he purchases the new product at the price 
of p, his surplus would be w + Lν − p.  There are two cases to consider depending on the 
relative magnitudes of  ∆ and Lν .   If ∆ > Lν , the quality increase is not sufficient for the 
supplier of the new product to overcome the installed-base effect and consumer 2 follows 
suit and buys the old product.  However, if ∆ < Lν , the firm can charge p = Lν  - ∆ and 
sell the new product to consumer 2.  In such a case, incompatibility will prevail and the 
network benefit of ∆ is lost.   
Now let us analyze a subgame in which consumer 1 delayed her purchase, and the 
quality realization of the new product in the second period is low.  In this case, the old 
and new products compete on a level playing field without any installed base.  The new 
product will be sold to both consumers at the price of p = Lν . 
To limit the number of cases to consider, let us assume that ∆ > Lν .10  With this 
assumption, consumer 1’s payoff from purchasing the currently available product is given 
                                                 
9 We could also introduce uncertainty in the incremental value when the quality realization is low without 
affecting the main qualitative results. 
10 The other case can be easily analyzed without affecting the main results. 
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by w + (w + ∆) = 2w + ∆ since consumer 2 will also purchase the same product to enjoy 
network benefits.  In contrast, if she waits, she will pay the price of Lν  in the second 
period and gets the payoff of (w + ∆).  The assumption thus implies that consumer 1’s 
optimal choice is to purchase the available product in period 1 if the quality of new 
product is known to be low for sure.  From the perspective of the firm with a low quality 
product, its profit is zero if consumer 1 purchases the old product whereas its profit 
becomes 2 Lν  if consumer 1 decides to wait.  Thus, the benefit of inducing the first period 
consumer to wait is given by 2 Lν . 
Now consider the case where the firm has a high quality product.  Suppose that 
consumer 1 has already made a purchase in the first period.  Once again, consumer 2 has 
two options.  If he purchases the competitively supplied product like consumer 1, he has 
surplus of w + ∆ as before.  In contrast, if he purchases the new product at the price of p, 
his surplus would be w + Hν - p.   The firm has two candidates for the optimal price, 
( Hν - ∆) or ( Hν - ∆).  If the firm charges ( Hν - ∆), consumers will buy the product only 
with probability α.  Thus, the expected payoff is given by α ( Hν - ∆).  In contrast, if the 
firm charges ( Hν - ∆), consumers buy the product for sure with a profit of ( Hν - ∆).  To 
limit the number of cases to consider, we make the following assumption, which implies 
that the optimal price for the firm is ( Hν - ∆): 
    α < H
H
ν
ν
− ∆
− ∆      (1) 
The assumption also implies that when consumer 1 makes her purchase in the first 
period, if the new product is of high quality, she will be stranded by consumer 2 who will 
choose to purchase it.  Thus, her payoff is given by 2w if she makes a purchase in the first 
period.   
Now let us analyze a subgame in which consumer 1 delayed her purchase, and the 
quality realization of the new product in the second period is high.  The optimal price for 
the firm is either Hν  or Hν .  If the firm charges Hν , consumers will buy the product 
only with probability α.  Thus, the expected payoff is given by α (2 Hν ).  In contrast, if 
the firm charges Hν , consumers buy the product for sure and obtains a profit of 2 Hν .  
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Inequality (1) above implies that α < H
H
ν
ν .  Thus, the optimal price for the firm is Hν .   
As a result, when consumer 1 decides to wait until period 2, her expected surplus is given 
by w + ∆ + α ( Hν  − Hν ).  Recall that her expected payoff is given by 2w if she makes a 
purchase in the first period.   To have a meaningful analysis, we assume that:  
w < ∆ + α ( Hν  − Hν )     (2) 
The condition above says that consumer 1 will prefer to wait if the firm is known to have 
a high quality product for sure.   
Let µ denote consumers’ belief that the firm has a high-quality product.  Then, we 
can define a critical level of belief µ  at which consumers are indifferent between 
purchasing the currently available product in the first period and waiting for the new 
product until the second period. 
µ (2w) + (1- µ )(2w + ∆) = µ (w + ∆ + α ( Hν  − Hν )] + (1- µ )(w + ∆)  
That is,    
( )H H
wµ α ν ν= ∆ + −       (3) 
 
We assume that µ  is between θ1 and θ2.  This implies that if the firm’s type is known to 
be θ2, the expected quality of the new product is high enough that the consumer in the 
first period will delay her purchase until the second period. However, if the firm’s type is 
known to be θ1, she will not wait. 
Let Hwπ  ( Lwπ ) denote the profit for the firm that introduces a high-quality product 
(low-quality product) when consumer 1 waits.  In our model, we have Hwπ  = 2 Hν  and 
L
wπ = 2 Lν with Hwπ > Lwπ > 0.  The corresponding profits when consumer 1 does not wait 
are Hnwπ = ( Hν - ∆) and Lnwπ = 0, respectively.  If the new product is of high quality, it is 
mutually beneficial for consumer 1 (see inequality (2)) and the firm ( Hwπ > Hnwπ ) that the 
consumer wait for the new product.  This implies that if announcing a high-quality 
product induces consumers to wait until period two, the firm with the low-quality product 
has an incentive to mislead consumers and announce a high-quality product.  Therefore, 
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product pre-announcements cannot impart any information to consumers if the game is 
played only once.  In the next section, we analyze whether or not we can have an 
informative equilibrium if the announcement game is played repeatedly. 
 
III. The Existence of an Informative Equilibrium 
Now we allow for the possibility that the firm announces in the first period the 
product quality in each cycle prior to its release in the second period.   We are searching 
for a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in which all players’ strategies are sequentially 
optimal and consumers’ beliefs about the firm’s type are derived by Bayes’ rule, 
whenever possible.   We assume that product pre-announcements are ‘cheap talk.’ As in 
any model of cheap talk, we have a babbling equilibrium in which the cheap talk has no 
meaning and is rationally ignored by the receiver.   Instead, we are interested in whether 
we can have an informative equilibrium in which the firm, by making an announcement, 
can convey credible information on the quality of its product to consumers.  We analyze 
how reputations are formed in equilibrium and how concern over reputation affects cheap 
talk.  
Figure 1 describes the timing of the game.   We denote the discount factor 
between the two product cycles by δ.   We can capture differences in the importance of 
the two products by the discount factor δ.  Even though the two product cycles entail 
different products, we assume that all parameters are the same across cycles.11  We can 
easily modify the model to allow different parameter values with additional notation.   
 
 
                                                 
11 We also maintain the same sequential structure across product cycles in which consumer 1 chooses first 
in the first period and consumer 2 makes choices in the second period.  However, this assumption is 
unnatural if we imagine a scenario in which consumers 1 and 2 differ only in terms of arrival time during 
the first product cycle.   Under such a scenario, it would be natural to assume that they make the decision 
simultaneously in the second product cycle since both of them are already there.   Allowing simultaneous 
choice would not change the qualitative results.   Alternatively, we can think of consumers in the second 
product cycle as different groups but with the knowledge of past history in the market. 
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First Product Cycle Second Product Cycle 
 
 
 
 
Period 2 
 
A new product is 
introduced, and its 
true quality is 
revealed.  
Consumer 2 makes 
a decision given 
the choice of 
consumer 1.  If 
consumer 1 
waited, they 
choose 
simultaneously. 
Period 1 
The two periods in the 
first product cycle are 
repeated. 
 
After observing the quality 
of the new product, the firm  
announces its quality.  
 
Consumer 1 chooses to wait 
or buys the current product, 
which is competitively 
supplied. 
 Figure 1: The Timing of Moves 
 
As usual, we proceed by using backward induction to derive the informative 
equilibrium.   In the second product cycle, the firm’s announcement does not convey any 
credible information since it is the last interaction between the firm and consumers.  Thus, 
consumers make their decision based only on their updated belief about the firm’s type 
derived from the past product cycle.  Let µ2 denote the consumers’ updated belief of the 
firm’s probability of delivering a high-quality product in the second product cycle.  We 
interpret µ2  as the reputation level of the firm.   If µ2 is higher than 
( )H H
wµ α ν ν= ∆ + − , 
consumers will wait until period two in the second product cycle.  
If consumer 1 does not wait until the second product cycle, a firm of type θ’s ex 
ante expected profit (i.e., before knowing whether it has a high- or low-quality product), 
is given by ( ) (1 )H Lnw nw nwπ θ θπ θ π= + − = θ( Hν − ∆).  However, if consumers wait, the 
firm’s ex ante expected profit is ( ) (1 )H Lww wπ θ θπ θ π= + − = θ(2 Hν ) + (1-θ) (2 Lν ).  Note 
that [ ( )wπ θ − ( )nwπ θ ] = θ( Hν + ∆) + (1-θ) (2 Lν ) is increasing in θ.  That is, even though 
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all types benefit from consumers’ waiting, type θ2 has a higher return from waiting than 
type θ1. As a result, type θ2 has more reputation concerns than type θ1 if a better 
reputation induces consumers to wait, which implies that the Spence-Mirrles single 
crossing property holds.12  Due to the single crossing property, we can obtain a separating 
equilibrium in which higher types make an honest announcement, while lower types 
could intentionally make a false announcement. We are interested in conditions under 
which the firm’s reputation concerns lead the firm to make an honest announcement of its 
product quality in the first product cycle.   
In particular, we are looking for an informative equilibrium with the following 
properties: 
(1) If the firm has a high-quality product in the first cycle, both types truthfully 
announce a high-quality product.  Consumer 1 takes the announcements as 
partially true and waits until the second period in the first product cycle.  Since 
her belief is confirmed, she updates her belief upward and also waits for a new 
product in the second product cycle.  
(2) If the firm has a low-quality product in the first cycle,  
(i) the θ1-type firm makes a false announcement that its product is of high quality, 
and consumer 1 is misled into waiting for the new product in the first cycle.  She 
will revise her belief downward and does not wait in the second cycle. 
(ii) the θ2-type firm makes a truthful announcement (or does not make an 
announcement), and consumer 1 does not wait in the first cycle.  However, she 
will revise her belief upward and reward the firm by waiting in the second product 
cycle. 
 
Knowing that a firm might make an intentional false announcement, consumer 1 
updates her belief about the new product’s quality based on the firm’s announcement 
strategy. Given the equilibrium strategies of the firm above, if the firm announces a high-
quality product in the first cycle, the updated belief that the product is of high quality in 
the first cycle is given by: 
µ1H =
2 (1 )
q
q qθ + − θ2 + ( 21 (1 )qq qθ −+ − )θ1    (4)   
                                                 
12 See Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) for more details. 
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For the product pre-announcements to have impacts on consumer’s waiting decision, we 
assume the following: 
µ1H > µ         (5) 
This assumption implies that when the firm announces a high-quality product, 
consumer 1 will wait for the new product in the first cycle. If the announcement turns out 
to be true, then consumer 1 will update her belief about the firm’s type according to the 
Bayes rule.  The posterior probability that the firm is a high type can be derived as: 
Pr(θ = θ2|Quality = H) 
 = 2 2
2 2 1
Pr( ) Pr( | )
Pr( ) Pr( | ) Pr( ) Pr( | )
Quality H
Quality H Quality H 2
θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
= = =
= = = + = = =  
= 2
2 1(1 )
q
q q
θ
θ θ+ −          
 Thus, µ2 becomes 2
2 (1 )
q
q q
θ
1θ θ+ − θ2+( 12(1 )(1 )qq qθ 1θ θ−+ − )θ1. If the announcement turns out to be false, 
then µ2 becomes θ1.  Since 2
2 1(1 )
q
q q
θ
θ θ+ − > 22 (1 )
q
q
θ
θ q+ − , equation (5) implies that 
2
2 (1 )
q
q q
θ
1θ θ+ − θ2+( 12(1 )(1 )qq qθ 1θ θ−+ − )θ1> µ .  In other words, if the firm introduces a high-quality 
product in the first cycle, consumer 1 will wait in the second cycle as stated in the 
description of the equilibrium.   
Finally, if the firm does not make an announcement in the first cycle, then 
consumer 1 does not wait in the first cycle, and µ2 = θ2.   Since we assume that θ2 > µ , 
consumer 1 will wait in the second cycle. 
Let us check whether the firm’s strategies described above satisfy incentive 
compatibility constraints in the first product cycle. If the firm has a high-quality product 
in the first cycle, it is obvious that it is an optimal strategy for the firm to make an honest 
announcement.  Now consider the case in which the firm has a low-quality product in the 
first cycle. If the firm makes a false announcement, consumers will wait, and the firm’s 
profit in the first product cycle is Lwπ = 2 Lν .   However, the firm loses its reputation and 
consumers will not wait in the second product cycle.  As a result, its expected profit in 
the second product cycle is δ ( )nwπ θ = δ [θ Hnwπ  +(1−θ) Lnwπ ]= δθ( Hν − ∆).  In contrast, if 
the firm does not make an announcement, it gets zero profit in the first product cycle, and 
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its expected profit in the second product cycle is ( ) [ (1 ) ]H Lw w wδπ θ δ θπ θ π= + − = 
δ[θ(2 Hν ) + (1-θ) (2 Lν )].     Consumers wait in the second product cycle and the firm’s 
expected profit in such a scenario depends on the ex ante probability that the firm can 
develop a high quality product (i. e., the firm’s type, θ). 
The incentive compatibility condition for type θ2 with a low-quality product to 
make a true announcement in the first cycle is given by:  
L
nwπ  +  δ[θ2 Hwπ  +(1−θ2) Lwπ ] ≥ Lwπ  + δ[θ2 Hnwπ  +(1−θ2) Lnwπ ]   (6) 
The corresponding condition for type θ1 with a low-quality product to make a false 
announcement in the first cycle is given by:  
L
wπ  + δ[θ1 Hnwπ  +(1−θ1) Lnwπ ] ≥ Lnwπ  +  δ[θ1 Hwπ  +(1−θ1) Lwπ ]   (7) 
In our model, the two conditions above can be rewritten as:  
θ1 < 1 2 2
L
H L
v
v v
δ
δ
−
+ ∆ − < θ2    (8) 
 
Thus, we can conclude that if conditions (5) and (8) are satisfied, the informative 
equilibrium described above is possible.13  
 
IV. Welfare Analysis 
In the previous section, we conducted a positive analysis identifying conditions 
under which product pre-announcements can convey (partial) information to potential 
consumers.  In this section, we conduct a normative analysis to investigate implications 
of product pre-announcements for social welfare and antitrust policy.  In Choi et al. 
(2004), we showed that allowing pre-announcements helps consumers make better 
decisions, and its ex ante effect on expected consumer welfare is positive in a set-up 
without network effects.  Here we find that this result is robust to the introduction of 
network effects.   
 
Proposition 1. Allowing pre-announcement improves expected consumer welfare in the 
presence of network effects. 
                                                 
13 It can easily be verified that the set of parameters satisfying conditions (5) and (8) is non-empty. 
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Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
In the Appendix, we prove that consumers taken together are always better off 
with product pre-announcements, even if the firm is allowed to make misleading claims 
about its future product.  In fact, it turns out that consumer 2’s surplus is independent of 
consumer 1’s purchase/delay decision.  More specifically, consumer 2’s surplus is (w + 
∆) if the product is of low quality whereas it is given by (w + α ( Hν  − Hν ) + ∆) if the 
product is of high quality, regardless of whether consumer 1 waits in the first period or 
not. Therefore, product pre-announcements have no effects on consumer 2’s welfare.  
We turn our attention to consumer 1’s welfare and argue that consumer 1 is 
unambiguously better off with product pre-announcements.  The intuition for this result is 
the same as in Choi et al. (2004) who shows a similar result in the absence of network 
effects.  Consumer 1 can rationally discount the firm’s claims, and the firm’s 
announcement can be at least partially revealing.  Therefore, it can only help consumer 1 
make a better decision.   
In particular, there are two effects that help consumer 1.   In the first product 
cycle, the high-type firm (θ =θ2) reveals its quality truthfully when they have a low-
quality product and, thus, enhance their reputation. 14    In contrast, such valuable 
information will not be available in the absence of product pre-announcements.   If the 
firm announces a high-quality product, consumers will update their beliefs accordingly, 
taking into account the fact that low-type firms with a low-quality product will lie. As a 
result, consumer 1, who is assumed to be rational, makes better ex ante decisions with 
product pre-announcements in an informative equilibrium.  
In the second product cycle, there is an additional informational benefit from 
better sorting.   To be more precise, we can consider three possible histories in the second 
product cycle.  If the firm introduced a high-quality product in the first cycle, the 
consumer welfare in the second product cycle would be the same across the two regimes 
since consumers have the same beliefs about the firm in both cases and behave in the 
same way.  However, if the firm introduced a low-quality product in the first cycle, 
consumers can sort the firm into one of the two types depending on whether or not they 
                                                 
14 Morris (2001) calls this the discipline effect. 
 17
have lied.  As a result, consumer 1 can make better ex ante decisions in the second cycle 
with product pre-announcements.   With these two informational effects taken together, 
we can conclude that consumer 1 is better off in our model. 
Our welfare result for consumers thus formalizes the argument in Fisher, et al. 
(1983) and Levy (1997).  They reason that “[b]roken promises and unattractive products 
can be expected to lead quickly to a loss of credibility and sales” (Fisher, et al., 1983).  
As a result, firms will refrain from making false announcements due to concerns about 
reputation, and “there is no reason to inhibit the time when a firm announces or brings 
products to the market place.”  In a sense, however, our result is stronger than their claim. 
In our model, deliberate misrepresentations take place in equilibrium due to the existence 
of different firm types.  Nonetheless, we were able to show that consumers are better off 
with product pre-announcements as long as consumers are aware of such incentives for 
misrepresentation on the part of the firm.15   
We can also show that in this simple, twice-repeated cheap-talk game, the firm’s 
ex ante profit also increases.  A proof is given in the Appendix.  Thus, the total surplus 
(consumer surplus + firm profit) also increases with the possibility of product pre-
announcements.  
 
IV.  Concluding Remarks 
It is common practice for firms to announce new products well in advance of 
actual market availability.   This practice, often called “vaporware,” has been especially 
prominent in industries characterized by network effects, such as the computer industry, 
since early lock-ins might preclude the emergence of superior technologies in these 
industries.   However, product pre-announcements often are not fulfilled and have been a 
topic of intensive discussion both in the business press and the anti-trust arena.   We have 
developed a simple model to analyze the effects of product pre-announcements.  In 
particular, we derived conditions under which such an announcement can impart valuable 
                                                 
15 One can ask why antitrust policy cannot focus only on false claims made by the firm, allowing only 
truthful product pre-announcements.   However, it would be difficult to implement such a policy because of 
the ambiguity associated with ascertaining whether the firm actually delivered the promised quality, 
especially when the new features promised are something non-existent at the time of announcement.  This 
fact makes direct contracting between the firm and consumers infeasible in the first place.    
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information to consumers, even if the announcement is cheap talk that does not entail any 
direct cost of signaling.  In addition, we have investigated its welfare implications.   
We find that reputational concerns can be used as an incentive device to make 
cheap talk partially informative.  As a result, consumers are able to make better inter-
temporal purchase decisions and are better off with product pre-announcements as long 
as consumers are rational and understand the incentives of low-type firms to mislead 
consumers.  Thus, we confirm that the welfare result of Choi et al. (2004) is robust to the 
introduction of network effects.  This is in sharp contrast to Farrell and Saloner (1986) 
who show that product pre-announcements may influence which product prevails in the 
marketplace and lead to socially inefficient technology adoption. The inefficiency in their 
paper arises from “stranding” of consumers who were unaware of the availability of the 
new product in the future and have already purchased the old product before 
announcement.16  This suggests that we may need an element of “surprise” to derive 
inefficiencies associated with product pre-announcements, which is absent in our model.   
 
                                                 
16 Their paper, however, considers only truthful pre-announcements and does not analyze the possibility of 
false announcements and consumers’ inference problem about their informational content. 
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Appendix  
The effect of product announcements on consumer welfare 
 
In the Appendix, we analyze how the firm’s product announcements affect 
consumer welfare in the simple two-type model with network effects.  Let HwCS  (
L
wCS ) 
denote the total consumer surplus (for consumer 1 and 2) in each product cycle when 
consumer 1 waits and the firm introduces a high-quality product (low-quality product) in 
period 2.   Similarly, we denote corresponding consumer surplus when consumer 1 does 
not wait and purchases the existing product in period 1 as HnwCS  (
L
nwCS ).   
In our model, we have  
H
wCS  = 2[w + ∆ + α ( Hν  − Hν )] 
L
wCS  = 2[w + ∆]  
H
nwCS =  (2w)+ [w + α ( Hν  − Hν ) + ∆] = 3w + α ( Hν  − Hν ) + ∆ 
L
nwCS  = (2w + ∆ ) + (w + ∆) = 3w + 2∆ 
 
When the firm is allowed to make product pre-announcements, the expected total 
consumer welfare in the informative equilibrium is as follows: 
 
WA= W1A + δW2A 
= (1-q)[θ1 HwCS + (1-θ1) LwCS ] + q(θ2 HwCS  + (1-θ2) LnwCS ) 
+ δ [(1-q){θ1(θ1 HwCS  +(1-θ1) LwCS ) + (1-θ1) (θ1 HnwCS  +(1-θ1) LnwCS )} + 
q{θ2(θ2 HwCS  +(1-θ2) LwCS ) + (1-θ2) (θ2 HwCS  +(1-θ2) LwCS )}] 
(where WiA denotes total consumer welfare in product cycle i, i =1,2 when pre-
announcements are allowed) 
 
Let us analyze how prohibiting pre-announcements affects consumers’ welfare. 
First, suppose that qθ2+(1-q)θ1< µ . Then, if the social planner prohibits pre-
announcements, consumer 1 will buy the currently available product. In the second cycle, 
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consumers 1 will update her beliefs about the product’s quality based on whether the 
product in period one is of high quality. If the firm produced a high-quality product in the 
first cycle, then the updated belief that the product is of high quality in the second cycle is 
given by 2
1 2(1 )
q
q q
θ
θ θ− + θ2+(1- 21 2(1 )qq qθθ θ− + )θ1.  In contrast, if the firm produced a low-quality 
product in the first cycle, the updated belief is given by 
)1()1)(1(
)1(
21
2
θθ
θ
−+−−
−
qq
q θ2+ )1()1)(1( )1)(1( 21 1 θθ θ −+−− −− qq q θ1.  By condition (5) and the fact that )1()1)(1( )1( 21 2 θθ θ −+−− − qq q <q, 
consumer 1 will wait for a new product in the second cycle only if the product in the first 
cycle is of high quality. The total expected consumer welfare is as follows: 
 
WNA = W1NA + δW2NA  
= (1-q)[θ1 HnwCS + (1-θ1) LnwCS ] + q(θ2 HnwCS  + (1-θ2) LnwCS ) 
+ δ [(1-q){θ1(θ1 HwCS  +(1-θ1) LwCS ) + (1-θ1) (θ1 HnwCS  +(1-θ1) LnwCS )} + 
q{θ2(θ2 HwCS  +(1-θ2) LwCS ) + (1-θ2) (θ2 HnwCS  +(1-θ2) LnwCS )}]   
(where WiNA denotes total consumer welfare in product cycle i, i =1,2 when pre-
announcements are not allowed) 
Let us compare WA and WNA.   First, W1A - W1NA = ((1-q)θ1+qθ2)( HwCS - HnwCS ) 
+(1-q)(1- θ1)( LwCS - LnwCS ) = ((1-q)θ1+qθ2) [∆ + α ( Hν  − Hν ) - w] - (1-q)(1- θ1)w. 
 If we divide both sides by (1-q+q θ2), we get µ1H [∆ + α ( Hν  − Hν ) - w] - (1-µ1H)w = 
{µ1H [∆ + α ( Hν  − Hν ) - w] - (1-µ1H)w}, where µ1H= 22 (1 )qq qθθ + − +( 21 (1 )qq qθ −+ − )θ1.  Since µ1H 
> µ , the expression in the curly bracket above is positive.  We thus have that W1A - 
W1NA>0.  Second, W2A – W2NA = q(1-θ2)( θ2[∆ + α ( Hν  − Hν ) - w] - (1-θ2) w) = q(1-
θ2)[ θ2{∆ + α ( Hν  − Hν ) – w} - (1-θ2) w].  Since θ2 > µ , W2A – W2NA>0. Thus, we have 
WA > WNA. 
Second, suppose that qθ2+(1-q)θ1> µ . Then, if the firm is not allowed to make 
product pre- announcements, consumers will wait for a new product in the first cycle. 
Consumers will wait in the second cycle only if the product in the first cycle is of high 
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quality as in the previous case.  In the second case, the expected consumer welfare can be 
written as follows: 
iW NA = iW 1NA + δiW 2NA  
= (1-q)[θ1 HwCS + (1-θ1) LwCS ] + q(θ2 HwCS  + (1-θ2) LwCS ) 
+ δ [(1-q){θ1(θ1 HwCS  +(1-θ1) LwCS ) + (1-θ1) (θ1 HnwCS  +(1-θ1) LnwCS )} + 
q{θ2(θ2 HwCS  +(1-θ2) LwCS ) + (1-θ2) (θ2 HnwCS  +(1-θ2) LnwCS )}]   
Let us compare WA and NAiW .  First, W1A - iW 1NA= q(1- θ )( 2 LnwCS - LwCS ) = w>0. Second, 
since iW 2NA = W2NA, we have W2A – iW 2NA>0. Thus, we have WA > iW NA. 
 
Combining these two cases, we can conclude that allowing pre-announcements 
always helps consumers make a better decision, and its effect on consumer welfare is 
positive.
 The effect of product announcements on firm profit 
 
The analysis of the effect of product announcements on the firm profit closely 
follows the method of proof above.  When the firm is allowed to make product pre-
announcements, the expected firm profit in the informative equilibrium is as follows, 
 
ΠA= Π1A + δΠ2A 
= (1-q)[θ1 Hwπ + (1-θ1) Lwπ ] + q(θ2 Hwπ  + (1-θ2) Lnwπ ) 
+ δ [(1-q){θ1(θ1 Hwπ  +(1-θ1) Lwπ ) + (1-θ1) (θ1 Hnwπ  +(1-θ1) Lnwπ )} + q{θ2(θ2 Hwπ  
+(1-θ2) Lwπ ) + (1-θ2) (θ2 Hwπ  +(1-θ2) Lwπ )}] 
(where  Π iA denotes firm profit in product cycle i, i =1,2 when pre-
announcements are allowed) 
 
Let us analyze how prohibiting pre-announcements affects the firm profit. First, 
suppose that qθ2+(1-q)θ1< µ .   By the same logic presented above, the total expected 
firm profit in this case can be written as follows: 
 
 24
ΠNA = Π1NA + δΠ2NA  
= (1-q)[θ1 Hnwπ + (1-θ1) Lnwπ ] + q(θ2 Hnwπ  + (1-θ2) Lnwπ ) 
+ δ [(1-q){θ1(θ1 Hwπ  +(1-θ1) Lwπ ) + (1-θ1) (θ1 Hnwπ  +(1-θ1) Lnwπ )} + q{θ2(θ2 Hwπ  
+(1-θ2) Lwπ ) + (1-θ2) (θ2 Hnwπ  +(1-θ2) Lnwπ )}]   
(where ΠiNA denotes expected firm profit in product cycle i, i =1,2 when pre-
announcements are not allowed) 
Let us compare ΠA and ΠNA.   First, Π1A - Π1NA = ((1-q)θ1+qθ2)( Hwπ - Hnwπ ) +(1-
q)(1- θ1)( Lwπ - Lnwπ ) = ((1-q)θ1+qθ2) [ Hν  + ∆] + (1-q)(1- θ1) (2 Lν ) > 0.  Second, Π2A – 
Π2NA = q(1-θ2)( θ2[ Hν  + ∆] +  (1-θ2) (2 Lν ) > 0.  Thus, we have ΠA > ΠNA.
Second, suppose that qθ2+(1-q)θ1> µ . Then, if the firm is not allowed to make 
product pre-announcements, consumer 1 will wait for a new product in the first cycle. 
Consumer 1 will wait in the second cycle only if the product in the first cycle is of high 
quality as in the previous case.  In the second case, the expected firm profit can be written 
as follows: 
iΠ NA = iΠ 1NA + δ iΠ 2NA  
= (1-q)[θ1 Hwπ + (1-θ1) Lwπ ] + q(θ2 Hwπ  + (1-θ2) Lwπ ) 
+ δ [(1-q){θ1(θ1 Hwπ  +(1-θ1) Lwπ ) + (1-θ1) (θ1 Hnwπ  +(1-θ1) Lnwπ )} + q{θ2(θ2 Hwπ  
+(1-θ2) Lwπ ) + (1-θ2) (θ2 Hnwπ  +(1-θ2) Lnwπ )}]   
Let us compare ΠA and iΠ NA.   ΠA − iΠ NA = − q(1- θ2) (2 Lν )  + δ[q(1-θ2)( θ2[ Hν  
+ ∆] +  (1-θ2) (2 Lν ))] =  q(1- θ2)[ δ{θ2( Hν  + ∆) +  (1-θ2) (2 Lν )}- 2 Lν ] > 0 by condition 
(8).  
Combining these two cases, we can conclude that allowing pre-announcements 
also increases the ex ante firm profit.   
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